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No Joint Ownership! Shared Emotions Are
Social-relational Emotions
Vivian Bohl
Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
ere are cases of emotion that we readily describe as ‘sharing emotions with other
people.’ How should we understand such cases? Joel Krueger has proposed the
Joint Ownershipesis (JOT): the view that two or more people can literally share
the same emotional episode. His view is partly inspired by his reading of Merleau-
Ponty—arguably Merleau-Ponty advocates a version of JOT in his “e child’s re-
lations with others.” My critical analysis demonstrates that JOT is awed in several
respects: 1) It involves a vague account of joint subjects; 2) It relies on a confusion be-
tween phenomenological and ontological levels of analysis. When these are clearly
distinguished, Krueger’s phenomenological analysis contradicts JOT understood as
an ontological claim; 3) It relies on a highly problematic coupling-constitution in-
ference; 4) It relies on a shi from the claim that the child and the caregiver jointly
realize an emotion, to the claim about joint ownership, which is a non sequitur. I
argue that we can reach a better understanding of the phenomenon of shared emo-
tions by bringing in another level of analysis: that of social relationships. I propose
that shared emotions are a special case of social-relational emotions, typically arising
within and/or giving rise to communal relationships.
Keywords: social cognition, social relationships, relational models theory, shared
mental states, collective intentionality, joint ownership thesis
1. Introduction
‘Emotion’ is a common term in folk psychology as well as in scientic and
philosophical research. In everyday language, people oen talk about shar-
ing emotions and other mental states. For example, we say that we share
joy or sadness with a friend or a family member. But can we literally share
aective states with others and, if we can do so, what is the proper concep-
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tion of such states? Joel Krueger (2013) argues, proceeding from a reading of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty1 (1964) and from an analysis of positive emotions
in very young infants, that two individuals can literally own the same token
of an emotion. He labels this claim the joint ownership thesis (JOT).2 In this
paper, I argue against Krueger’s JOT and propose that shared emotions are
best conceptualized as a specic type of social-relational emotions.
I begin by outlining some of the most common ways philosophers have
been thinking about collective or shared mental states (section 2). is will
serve as a background for introducing Krueger’s radical thesis—JOT—in
section 3. In section 4, I argue against Krueger’s account of JOT by showing
that: 1) it fails to clearly distinguish between the thesis of joint ownership and
the thesis of joint subjects and includes a vague account of joint subjects; 2)
it lumps together phenomenological and ontological levels of analysis; when
these two levels of analysis are kept apart, then the phenomenological analy-
sis actually speaks against JOT as an ontological thesis; 3) it draws on a prob-
lematic inference from coupling to constitution; 4) it draws on a non sequitur
inference from a claim about the realization of emotions to a claim about the
ownership of emotions. Although JOT fails, from the perspective of social
cognition research, the case of positive emotions in very young infants is
still an interesting paradigm case of shared emotions. Positive emotions in
infants seem to have some irreducibly intersubjective features that call for
further exploration. In section 5, I argue that in order to capture the inter-
subjective features of the case at hand (and in general), we need to bring in
another level of analysis: that of social relationships. I propose a working def-
inition for ‘social relationship’ and introduce the notion of social-relational
emotions. I further argue that shared emotions are best understood as a spe-
cial case of social-relational emotions arising within and/or giving rise to a
Communal Sharing relationship.
1 According to Krueger (2013), Merleau-Ponty (1964) argues against reducing intersubjec-
tivity to individual mental states and defends a version of JOT. I agree with the rst part:
it is plausible that Merleau-Ponty was not an individualist reductionist. But I strongly dis-
agree with the second part. It makes more sense to read Merleau-Ponty as advocating the
view that in order to understand intersubjectivity, we need to take the level of social re-
lationships seriously. Aer all, the title of the lecture series is “e child’s relations with
others.” A detailed exegesis of Merleau-Ponty’s work is beyond the scope of this paper—I
will leave it to scholars of Merleau-Ponty.
2 I focus on JOT as outlined in (Krueger 2013). In some more recent papers, Krueger ex-
presses somewhat more modest views on JOT (see e.g., Colombetti and Krueger 2015), but
my focus in this paper is what I take to be the strongest version of Krueger’s JOT.
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2. Sharing mental states
In order to provide a general background to the discussion in this paper, I
briey survey various ways the sharing ofmental states has been understood
in the philosophical literature.
e most common way in which sharing a mental state is understood is
as sharing the same general type of a mental state by having dierent tokens
of that type. For example, two persons can share a thought that a movie they
are watching is boring or they can share an intention to have dinner. Each
person has their own individual token of a mental state, e.g., a thought with
the content ‘this movie is boring.’ Even though those states may be directed
at the same real or intentional object (movie or dinner), the particular to-
kens of the general mental state type are strictly individual. In the special
case when the shared states are dispositional, not occurrent, the type-token
distinction still applies. Sharing the same preference for movies or being
inclined to intend the same kinds of actions are examples of sharing dispo-
sitional states in that sense. Although both persons can be characterized in
the same way at the general level of the mental state types, their individ-
ual token-dispositions would still be distinct from each other. is sense
of mental state sharing is uncontroversial: no one doubts that we can share
mental states with other people in this “thin” sense. But there is nothing in-
herently intersubjective or social about having dierent tokens of the same
type ofmental state. Authors whowish to conceive of sharedmental states as
inherently social have tried to locate the intersubjective element elsewhere.
I will now review these other options.
In reviewing those other options, I proceed from a useful distinction be-
tween the content,3 themode, and the subject of a mental state.4 e subject
of a mental state is the one who has the state, and this can be either a single
or a plural entity; e.g., an individual or a group. e content xes the (in-
tentional) object or state of aairs to which the state is directed. e mode
species the way the mental attitude (e.g., believing, desiring or fearing) is
directed at the object or state of aairs. e intersubjective element can be
located in any of these three components of the intentional state.
One family of views nds the intersubjective element in the content of an
intentional state.e crux of the idea is that the state is directed at some col-
lective circumstance, like doing something together. e content of such a
state might be, e.g., that ‘we do x together.’ Amore complex example of such
a view is provided in Michael Bratman’s (1999) account of shared intentions.
3 I focus here on mental states that have content and leave aside mental states that lack in-
tentional content; e.g., moods, pains or itches.
4 See (Schweikard and Schmid 2013). e following brief overview in this section is based
on their article.
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On his view, shared intentions consist primarily of attitudes of individuals
and their interrelations and the “we” located in the content of the individ-
ual intentions is to be understood in a distributive sense. For an intention
to x to be shared, all parties to the cooperation must: intend that they do
x together, do x because of such intentions, and do x in conformity with
those intentions. Moreover, that these conditions have been satised must
be common knowledge to all parties.
e second group of views locates the collectivity in the particularmode
of the shared mental state. As already said above, the mode of a mental state
is the way in which the subject is directed at an object. In the context of
collective intentionality, mode-theorists make a further distinction between
an I-mode and a we-mode. e we-mode is the rst-person plural mode
of mental attitudes. Wilfrid Sellars’ work on we-intention has paved the way
for subsequent research in that direction (see, e.g., Tuomela andMiller 1988).
John Searle (2010) can be seen as a mode theorist, although he himself does
not use the term ‘we-mode.’5 One of the most comprehensive accounts of a
we-mode belongs to Raimo Tuomela (2013). Drawing on Tuomela’s account,
Michael Schmitz (2017) distinguishes between subject content and object
content and argues that in a we-mode, other subjects are represented not as
objects, but as co-subjects in the subject content. A version of the we-mode
approach has been defended also from a neuroscientic point of view by
Gallotti and Frith (2013, 163), who understand representing aspects of the
world in the we-mode as “representing aspects of the interactive scene in
a distinct psychological attitude of intending-together, believing-together,
desiring-together.”
e third option is to place the collectivity in the subject of the men-
tal state. is means postulating plural subjects or groups as agents that are
taken to be irreducible to individual members of them and to have certain
mental states of their own. A version of the plural subject view is defended
by Margaret Gilbert. On her view, such subjects are created by undertaking
a joint commitment that implies normative obligations (Gilbert 2006).
Aswewill shortly see, some of Krueger’s claims suggest that he gravitates
towards the plural subject view. However, his main position, supported by
his reading ofMerleau-Ponty, seems to constitute an altogether dierent and
very radical approach, namely the thesis that two agents can literally share
the same mental state token. I will introduce Krueger’s position in the next
section.
5 But see (Salice 2015) for a critique of Searle’s we-intentions as primitive mental attitudes
and a defense of the view that Searle’s account reduces to a version of the content approach.
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3. Krueger’s view: Jointly owned positive emotions in early in-
fancy
Krueger (2013, 511) defends the joint ownership thesis (JOT): the idea that
“two subjects (. . . ) can be said simultaneously to share the same episode
of emotion.” He motivates his view by his reading of Merleau-Ponty’s fa-
mous lecture series “e child’s relations with others” (Merleau-Ponty 1964).
Krueger argues thatMerleau-Ponty can be interpreted as defending the view
that “certain early experiences are jointly owned, in that they are numeri-
cally single experiences that are nevertheless given tomore than one subject”
(Krueger 2013, 509). He further claims that according toMerleau-Ponty “the
newborn is experientially coupled to the caregiver in a state of phenomenal
undierentiation” (Krueger 2013, 514). He then moves on to support JOT by
drawing on an analysis of the case of positive emotions in very young infants
based on research in contemporary developmental psychology.
On Krueger’s account, the case of positive emotions in young infants
is a good candidate for a jointly owned mental state for two main reasons.
Firstly, he argues that young infants are incapable of experiencing positive
emotions on their own. A young infant is only able to experience themwhile
interacting with a caregiver who is currently in a positive emotional state.
e reason for this is that young infants’ attention is primarily exogenous—
i.e., infants have not yet developed top-down control over their attention, so
their attention is driven by the environment, and oen by their caregivers
(Krueger 2013, 515). In order to experience a positive emotion, the infant
needs to attend to some “happy stimuli” for a minimal period of time to
enable a positive emotion to arise. For young infants, such happy stimuli are
provided by caregivers when they interact with the infants and are in positive
aective states themselves. From this, Krueger concludes that in order to
experience positive emotions, infants rely on the cognitive scaolding that
their caregivers oer themduring social interactions. In otherwords, infants
can have positive emotions only by forming a coupled cognitive-aective
system with their caregiver (Krueger 2013, 516).
Secondly, Krueger argues, following Merleau-Ponty, that there is a lack
of robust self-other dierentiation in the phenomenological structure of the
experiences of positive emotions in young infants. Although he is careful
to point out that newborns are already likely to possess a very basic bod-
ily sense of self, he argues that the structure of their emotional experience
probably lacks stable self-other dierentiation because young infants have
limited inhibitory control. e lack of inhibitory control makes infants ex-
perience emotions without the opportunity to actively regulate those emo-
tions, so that they have an attenuated sense of “emotional agency” (Krueger
2013, 518). On Krueger’s account, the sense of agency is a necessary compo-
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nent of the awareness of oneself as a stable and enduring perspective on the
world, distinct from others. So he argues that when infants experience pos-
itive emotions, they dwell in a state of experiential undierentiation, more
or less in the wayMerleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis arguably sug-
gests.
4. Why JOT does not work
Krueger’s account is highly problematic in several respects. In the following,
I outline four problems with Krueger’s account.
4.1 Joint ownership or joint subjects?
Although Krueger’s (2013) goal is to outline and argue for JOT—the the-
sis that two or more subjects can jointly own an emotion—he also writes
about joint subjects.is is confusing. For example, in parallel to the clearly
stated expressions of JOT, Krueger writes that “the structure of some early
infant-caregiver dyadic exchanges is best described as involving joint sub-
jects” (Krueger 2013, 509–510, emphasis added) and that “it is sensible to
speak of caregivers as entering into the infant’s experience as a joint subject”
(Krueger 2013, 522, emphasis added). How is the talk about “joint subjects”
to be understood and is it compatible with JOT?
One interpretation of these statements is that Krueger gravitates towards
the plural subject thesis—the view that two ormore individuals form a higher
order entity that hasmental states of its own. But it remains unclear whether
one can consistently hold the position that two individual subjects own the
same token of a mental state and at the same time there is a single higher or-
der subject having themental state: it seems to lead to an overdetermination
on the part of the subject(s) of the mental states.
Another possible interpretationwould be that by joint subject(s)Krueger
actuallymeans an aggregate subject composed of the infant and the caregiver.
Krueger’s JOTwould then take the form of the claim that under certain con-
ditions, aggregate subjects can have a single token of an emotion.is view
is not logically inconsistent, but it would be a somewhat odd combination
of positions. e aggregate subject approach is the view that collectives are
reducible to sums or aggregates of individuals and it goes hand in hand with
the view that shared or collective mental states are reducible to aggregations
of individual states. Among researchers of collective intentionality, this view
is rather unpopular and typically criticized as too reductive and incapable of
explaining human sociality (see Schweikard and Schmid 2013). At best, a
combination of JOT and the aggregate subject approach would simply col-
lapse into pure JOT and would make talking about aggregates or “joint sub-
jects” superuous. At worst, it would be a controversial view: JOT is clearly a
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non-reductive account in that it does not reduce shared emotions to a simple
sum of two individual emotions, whereas the aggregate subject view seems
to imply reductionism. So the charitable conclusion to be drawn from this
is that Krueger probably does not have the aggregate subject or the plural
subject view in mind when he talks about “joint subject(s).”
Yet another possible, and perhaps more plausible, interpretation would
be that by “joint subjects” Krueger means something more distributive than
a higher order entity, but still something more substantial than an aggregate
subject. Joint subjects would be composed of individuals and their interrela-
tions, but there would be no higher order entity ontologically speaking.is
view would be consistent with JOT and might have potential. By “joint sub-
jects” Krueger might simply mean a plurality of individuals that participate
in one and the same token of an emotion.6 Unfortunately, Krueger does not
explain what exactly he has in mind when he talks about joint subjects, thus
I will not pursue this matter further. My main aim is to draw the reader’s
attention to the fact that Krueger’s account remains vague in this respect.
Let me oer one more possible reading—in fact, I think this is what
might be really going on. Krueger’s talk about “joint subjects” may be a la-
bel for his phenomenological description of young infants’ experiences of
positive emotions—i.e., a label for their subjective experience of dwelling in
a state of social undierentiation. As I will explain in the next section, it is
important to keep the phenomenological level of analysis apart from onto-
logical claims about mental states. JOT is clearly an ontological claim about
mental states, whereas if my interpretation is on the right track, Krueger’s
talk about joint subject(s) refers to the phenomenological description of in-
fant’s experience. Unfortunately, Krueger confuses these two levels of ana-
lysis and this is where he gets things wrong, as I will show in the next section.
4.2 Lumping together phenomenological and ontological claims
e analysis in the previous section revealed that Krueger’s vacillation
between the formulations of JOT and the idea of joint subjects makes most
sense if we interpret them as claims on two dierent levels of analysis:
whereas JOT is an ontological claim, Krueger’s talk about joint subjects is re-
stricted to the phenomenological analysis of infants’ experience. Although
phenomenological analyzes of experiences may inform and set constraints
on ontological claims aboutmental phenomena and vice versa, phenomeno-
logical and ontological claims do not directly reduce or translate into each
other, so one must be careful when moving between the two levels of analy-
sis.
6 I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out this option to me.
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Krueger (2013, 511) indeed explicitly acknowledges JOT as a matter of
ontology: “is is a claim about the ontology of certain early experiences.”
However, in his defense of JOT, he appeals to his phenomenological analy-
sis of the structure of experience of positive emotions in very young infants.
He argues that the state of phenomenal undierentiation—the lack of ro-
bust self-other dierentiation in the structure of infant’s experience—“is the
phenomenological condition that makes JOT possible” (Krueger 2013, 514).
is claim is perplexing. JOT is the thesis that two or more subjects own
one and the same token of an emotion. But what does it mean to own an
emotion? Let’s take occurrent states like happiness or joy as an example.
Owning a token of a joyful emotion implies experiencing it. In the context
of JOT this would translate into the claim that the experience of the emotion
is the same in all individuals jointly owning the emotion. In other words,
having the same token of an emotion implies having the same token of ex-
perience of the emotion. Indeed, this is one way that Krueger (2013, 509)
formulates JOT: “certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are
numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one
subject” (emphasis added). However, Krueger’s phenomenological analysis
of the infant’s experience contradicts JOT. If Krueger’s phenomenological
analysis is on the right track, the structure of the infant’s experience is fun-
damentally dierent from the structure of the caregiver’s experience. While
the latter has an underlying structure of self-other dierentiation, the former
lacks such structure, or so Krueger argues. However, it would be strange to
say that two individuals have the same token of an experience of an emotion
if their experiences are dierently structured.
Let us take a closer look at what JOT implies. Having the same token of
an experience of an emotion could mean either:
a) at the experience of the two individuals undergoing a jointly
owned emotion is qualitatively and numerically identical. So if
Krueger is right about the structure of the infant’s experience of
positive emotions being dierent from the structure of the care-
giver’s experience, infants and caregivers cannot jointly own emo-
tions because their experiences are structurally dierent and thus
both qualitatively and numerically non-identical. (However, the
possibility that two people who have an experience with the same
qualitative structure could jointly own a single experience is still
open. I will turn to this issue below and show that even if that were
the case, JOT still does not follow.)
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b) at there are numerically single emotions that can be experienced
dierently (for example, because they have a dierent phenomeno-
logical structure) by dierent subjects.
e second option is very counter-intuitive and would go against most if not
all theories of emotions. Occurrent emotions are not objects separate from
how they are experienced. It is possible for two people to have dierent in-
terpretations of the same emotion, but this is another matter—here we are
talking about the very experience of emotion. e structure of the experi-
ence is partly what makes the emotion what it is, so it would be odd to say
that two individuals can experience the same emotion while the structure of
their experience is dierent. us it is reasonable to assume that (a) holds.
It means that JOT applies to the case of emotions only if the structure of the
experience of the infant coincides with the structure of the experience of the
caregiver: either byway of the phenomenology of the infant being analogous
to that of the caregiver (and Krueger being wrong about the phenomenol-
ogy of infants), or by way of the adult’s experience also temporarily lacking
the structure of self-other dierentiation. Both options seem unlikely, but
let us just grant for the sake of argument that one or another is sometimes
the case. It would still only take us halfway towards JOT. Individuals hav-
ing an experience of an emotion with the same phenomenological structure
is necessary, but not sucient, for jointly owned emotions. Identical phe-
nomenological structure would be a prerequisite for qualitative identity of
the two mental states, but no proof of their numerical identity.
4.3 Coupling-constitution inference
Another line of argument that Krueger uses in favor of JOT draws on con-
temporary developmental psychology. It stems from the claim that very
young infants are simply incapable of experiencing positive emotions with-
out themoment-by-moment scaolding oered by their caregivers (Krueger
2013, 519).e claim is likely to raise a few eyebrows. Aer all, we know that
even newborns readily express negative emotions when they are hungry or
distressed, so what is so dierent about positive emotions? What is the evi-
dence that young infants cannot have positive emotions without the help of
caregivers?
As I explained in the previous section, Krueger relies on the fact that the
attention of very young infants is largely driven by the environment and of-
ten regulated by caregivers. When a caregiver interacts with an infant while
being in a positive emotional state oneself, the chances are that the infant will
also shi to a positive aective state. Krueger (2013, 521) describes this as the
caregiver’s positive aect “expanding” to include the infant, so that they end
up jointly owning the same token of the positive emotion.
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It is plausible that because of their attentional limitations, infants can-
not sustain positive emotions on their own. However, it is far from obvi-
ous that only caregivers who are genuinely experiencing positive emotions
themselves can evoke and support positive emotions in young infants. If
the issue comes down to providing “happy stimuli” to infants over whatever
period of time is required for the emotion to arise, an actor whomerely pre-
tends to have positive emotions seems sucient. Perhaps an interactive toy
or a funny cartoon can do the job. en the question becomes: are cases
where caregivers with genuine positive aect trigger positive emotions in
infants of an ontologically dierent type than the positive emotions that are
triggered in other ways, for instance by a toy? Are the former cases examples
of jointly owned mental states whereas the latter would be cases of individ-
ual mental states? Aer all, toys or cartoon characters do not experience
emotions, so it seems that the latter cases cannot possibly be cases of jointly
owned emotions.
For Krueger’s purposes, it does not have to be shown that only care-
givers experiencing positive emotions can support positive emotions in in-
fants. It is sucient, and indeed plausible, to assume that positive emotions
in young infants are sometimes (perhaps most of the time) supported by
caregivers’ positive emotions. In any case, whether toys or cartoons can of-
fer the necessary scaolding for young infants to have positive emotions is
an empirical issue that shall not seriously concern us here. I can only pro-
vide personal anecdotal evidence of having seen very young infants smiling
and completely mesmerized by “Teletubbies.” And there are cases where the
infant is happy to see the caregiver, although the caregiver does not see the
infant. If it is possible for infants to have positive emotions supported by toys
or cartoons, Krueger would have to assume a kind of disjunctivism between
two cases: (a) cases where a positive emotion in the infant is scaolded by an
artifact or another agent that does not undergo a positive emotion; (b) cases
where a positive emotion in the infant is scaolded by another subject who
genuinely undergoes a positive emotion.e latter would be a case of jointly
owned positive emotion, whereas the former is a priori excluded from being
a jointly owned state, because the infant is the only subject undergoing any
experience. It is more parsimonious and less mysterious to say that the in-
fant has an individual experience of positive emotion in both cases. So what
reasons could there be to believe otherwise?
Let us take a look at how Krueger’s argument proceeds. He argues that
the caregiver and the infant function as a coupled system: “While coupled
with the caregiver, this scaolding allows the infant to exceed her develop-
mental constraints and achieve a exibility and stability of attention well be-
yond her current developmental level” (Krueger 2013, 516). From the claim
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about coupling he moves on to the claim that “(t)he emotion of the care-
giver is (. . . ) a constituent part of the infant’s emotional experience (. . . )
the caregiver’s emotion is part of the very process responsible for the real-
ization of the emotion within the infant’s experience” (Krueger 2013, 521).
Here, Krueger makes a coupling-constitution inference: he begins by iden-
tifying a causal relation or “coupling” between the caregiver’s emotion and
the infant’s emotion and ends up inferring that there is a constitutive relation
between the two.
e same kind of inference is oen present in accounts of the extended
mind (see e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010). For instance, Alva
Noë (2004, 221) argues that “the environment can drive and so partially
constitute cognitive processes.” Critics of the extended mind approach ar-
gue that the coupling-constitution inference is seriously awed; they have
even labeled it the coupling-constitution fallacy (CCF) (see e.g., Adams and
Aizawa 2001; Adams and Aizawa 2008; Adams and Aizawa 2010; Aizawa
2010). Adams and Aizawa (2010, 590) write:
e fallacy in this kind of argument is easy to see (. . . ) the fact that a
process X is coupled to a process of type Y does not show that that X
is, in fact, also a (part of a) Y process or that the entire X-Y process is
of type Y.
In recent years, there have been heated discussions over CCF in circles of
defenders and opponents of extended mind and extended cognition. e
proponents of the extended mind approach can pursue one of the two fol-
lowing strategies for defending themselves against the charge that they have
committed theCCF.One strategy is to admit that an inference from coupling
to constitution is indeed fallacious, but to deny that for an extended mind
account an inference from coupling to constitution is necessary (cf. Aizawa
2010, 334). is strategy is not open to Krueger because the coupling-
constitution inference is clearly central to his argument. e other strategy
is to show that a coupling-constitution inference is not necessarily fallacious.
Several authors have argued that the CCF argument is question-begging
against the hypothesis of extended cognition, because it presupposes that
cognition cannot extend beyond the organism (see e.g., Menary 2006; Hur-
ley 2010; Ross and Ladyman 2010; Kagan and Lassiter 2013). To this, Adams
and Aizawa (2010, 595) have responded that their argument would remain
unaected even under the presupposition that an individual’s “biological
mass never in itself suces to form a cognitive system.”
Since Krueger clearly relies on a coupling-constitution inference, much
of the debate on CCF applies to his account of JOT. Unfortunately, Krueger
(2013) does not acknowledge that the coupling-constitution inference might
be problematic. In a more recent paper, where he defends various versions
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of the extended emotions hypothesis, including a version of JOT, he does
briey relate to the discussion on CCF, but quickly dismisses the whole dis-
cussion as having reached “something of a stalemate” (Krueger 2014, 544).
Krueger is right that there is a lack of consensus over how serious a threat
CCF poses to the extended cognition approach. Although I think that
Krueger’s inference from coupling to constitution is unwarranted, I will not
pursue the debate over CCF any further at this point. As I will show in the
next section, Krueger’s account of JOT falls apart even if we were to grant
the coupling-constitution inference as valid.
4.4 Confusing the system that realizes the emotion with the
owner of the emotion
Krueger’s JOT goes a lot further than the classical extended mind approach.
It can be seen as a very specic and radical version of the extended mind
account. In what follows, I argue that Krueger’s JOT fails even if we were to
favor the extended mind approach in general.
e classical example of a case of extended mind is the story of Inga and
Otto (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Inga is a healthy individual, whereas Otto
suers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s disease and has diculties with his
memory. In order to go to the Museum of Modern Art, Inga consults her
biological memory, whereas Otto consults his notebook for the address of
the museum. Clark and Chalmers argue that since Otto always carries his
notebook around and uses it regularly and reliably to remind himof the quo-
tidian facts that healthy individuals typically retrieve from their biological
memory, his notebook has become a part of his cognitive system just like
Inga’s biological memory-system is part of her cognitive system—the note-
book serves the same cognitive function forOtto as Inga’smemory serves for
her. Krueger seems to argue in a similar fashion: since the caregiver enables
the young infant to overcomehis or her cognitive limitations, the system that
brings about the infant’s positive emotion is extended in such a manner that
it includes the cognitive-aective processes of both individuals.7 As we have
already seen, Krueger (2013, 521) states that “(t)he emotion of the caregiver
is thus a constituent part of the infant’s emotional experience (. . . ).” Notice,
however, that this claim is at odds with JOT: if the caregiver and the infant
have the same token of an emotional experience, as JOT requires, how can
one be part of the other? ey are supposed to be identical.8 e puzzle
7 Onemight argue that the two cases are disanalogous: whereas Otto is cognitively disabled,
the young infant is a perfectly healthy individual. However, both have limited cognitive
capacities in comparison to a healthy adult.
8 In principle, it is possible that the token emotion co-owned by the individuals is a complex
entity and hence has parts that belong to dierent people. I am grateful to the reviewer for
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indicates that JOT is a much more demanding thesis than the classical hy-
pothesis of the extended mind: it requires more heavy liing than reliance
on a coupling-constitution inference, even if the latter were a valid inference.
e classical extended mind hypothesis concerns the vehicles of cogni-
tive processes and non-occurrent mental states such as dispositional beliefs
or memories. Clark (2010, 45) explicitly states that with the extended mind
hypothesis he and Chalmers “allowed that (as far as our argument was con-
cerned) conscious mental states might well turn out to supervene only on
local processes inside the head” (emphasis added). In contrast, Krueger fo-
cuses on conscious occurrent mental states—experiences of emotions. Fur-
thermore, he claims not only that the processes that realize infants’ positive
emotions are socially extended, but also that the resulting experiential state
is jointly owned by the infant and the caregiver. He moves from the claim
that “the caregiver provides socio-cognitive resources (positive aect) and
capacities (endogenous attention) that the infant incorporates into her own
basic suite of sensorimotor skills to (jointly) realize the experience” (Krueger
2013, 523) to the claim that “infant and caregiver might thus be said to share
the same episode of emotion” (Krueger 2013, 524). Unfortunately, he jumps
without argument from the claim
a) the extended infant-caregiver system realizes the emotion of the in-
fant
to the claim
b) the infant and the caregiver jointly own the same token of the ex-
perience of the emotion.
In fact, he does not seem to notice that these are two dierent claims and
that an extra argument is needed to make the latter point.
It is hard to see what argument could be put forward in favor of (b).
Even if it would make sense to say that positive emotions in young infants
are realized not only by their brains, but by a socially extended system, it
pointing out this possibility. But I nd it hard to make sense of the idea that the infant
and the caregiver experience the same token of an emotion (which might very well be a
complex entity) and, at the same time, that one person’s emotion is a part of the jointly
owned emotion. What does the individual experience then—her own individual emotion
as a part of the jointly owned emotion or the whole complex entity or both? If two in-
dividuals experience only their respective “parts” of the jointly owned emotion, then in
what sense do they have the same experience? How many emotions are involved in the
joint experience, ontologically speaking: one, two, or three? Perhaps it would make more
sense to say that dierent individuals can experience dierent aspects of the same shared
emotion—Schmid has been arguing in this direction (see Schmid 2009, 82).
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would not follow that a single emotion is owned or experienced by two sub-
jects. Usually, the cognitive system that realizes some mental state and the
owner/experiencer of the state do not coincide: the system is described at
the sub-personal level, whereas the owner of the state is the whole organism
or person. To illustrate: in humans, a particular activation of the insula re-
alizes the experience of disgust, but it is not the case that the person and the
insula jointly own the disgust experience. e insula does not experience
anything.
Another line of thought against JOT emerges from the following analogy
between positive emotions in infants and a common experience of tickling.
It is well known that healthy individuals cannot tickle themselves. I only
have the experience of being tickled when another person tickles me. is
has to dowith a certain “limitation” of howmy brainworks: I cannot prevent
the brain from predicting what self-touch feels like and therefore tickling
oneself does not feel tickly (see Blakemore et al. 1998). e “limitation” can
be easily overcome: all I need is someone else to tickle me. To use the jargon
of the extended mind approach: the system that realizes my experience of
being tickled is an extended system that includes the activity of my tickler.
But this would not make my experience of being tickled a jointly owned
experience: the experience of being tickled is owned by just one subject—
me.
e analogy between the case of tickling and the positive emotions in
infants is not perfect. In the latter case, both the caregiver and the infant
end up experiencing a positive emotion. Does that provide a good reason
to think that the infant and the caregiver experience the same episode of
emotion? I do not think so. Let us expand the example of tickling into a little
thought experiment. Imagine a world where there are two types of people:
those who can tickle themselves and those who need others to tickle them to
have the experience of being tickled.9 Tim is of the rst type, whereas Nora
is of the second. Now imagine that Tim tickles himself and then begins to
tickle Nora.ey end up tickling each other, so that both have an experience
of being tickled. Does it mean that they end up having the same token of an
experience of being tickled? Obviously not. e tickler case is analogous to
the case of positive emotions in young infants: the caregiver approaches the
infant while being in a positive emotional state, helps the infant to achieve
a positive emotional state, and they end up sustaining the positive emotion
in each-other via mutual interaction. However, the infant and the caregiver
have individual tokens of the experience of positive emotion.
9 In fact, this could be the world we currently live in: there is evidence that patients with cer-
tain psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia may be able to tickle themselves (see Shergill
et al. 2005).
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4.5 Summary of the critique of JOT
Joel Krueger analyzes the case of positive emotions in young infants and
argues that it is an example of two individuals jointly owning the same to-
ken of an occurrent mental state. Krueger’s account is awed in many re-
spects. Firstly, although his aim is to defend JOT, he also talks about joint
subjects without specifying what he means, which is more confusing than
helpful. Secondly, Krueger lumps together phenomenological and ontolog-
ical claims. Upon closer inspection, his phenomenological analysis of the
experience of the infant actually speaks against JOT as an ontological claim.
irdly, Krueger relies on a coupling-constitution inference that is contro-
versial, to say the least. Fourthly, he makes an illicit move from the claim
that the infant-caregiver system realizes the positive emotion of the infant
to the claim that the two subject jointly own the experience.is leads us to
the general conclusion that JOT fails as an account of shared mental states.
5. Positive proposal: Shared emotions are a special type of social-
relational emotions
Although JOT is false, there does seem to be something inherently social
or intersubjective in the experience of positive emotions in young infants.
How can we make sense of this intersubjective dimension without postulat-
ingmysteriousmental entities owned bymore than one individual, but do so
without reducing intersubjectivity to just a sum of strictly individual mental
states? I will outline an alternative way of thinking about shared emotions
by shiing to another level of analysis: that of social relationships. In what
follows, I argue that most cases of what researchers call ‘shared emotions’
fall under a subtype of social-relational emotions: emotions that arise out of
social relationships, and whose focus is some aspect of the relationship. I
will then apply this new approach to the case of positive emotions in young
infants.
5.1 What are social relationships?
Before I can introduce the idea of social-relational emotions, I rst need
to explain what I mean by social relationships. What is a social relation-
ship? Simply put, a social relationship is an inherently intersubjective phe-
nomenon: it does not reside within an individual mind, but can instead be
described as “the oscillating rhythm of inuence observed in the interac-
tions of two people” (Berscheid 2004, 32). An increasingly common way to
analyze social relationships is to model them as self-organizing dynamical
systems (Butler 2011). Relationships as self-organizing systems are seen as
organizing ensembles composed of closely integrated elements. Past states
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of the system partially inuence its future states and temporal changes of the
system are analyzable as functions of interactions among the elements. Ac-
cording to the dynamical systems approach, social relationships emerge as
higher order patterns of interactions that partially constrain and coordinate
the lower level elements (Butler 2011, 368).
At the same time, social relationships also have a cognitive dimension:
as humans, we do not just form relationships with others, we also cognitively
represent features of relationships that are not features of the participating
individuals as such (Fiske and Haslam 1996). According to relational models
theory, proposed by cognitive anthropologist Alan Page Fiske, coordination
of human social relationships is based on combinations of four elementary
cognitive models of social relationships (Fiske 1991; Fiske 1992). e four
elementary structures describe both social relationships in the world as well
as people’s implicit understanding of relationships. In otherwords, relational
models capture both psychological as well as ontological features of social
relations.
e rst model is called Communal Sharing. It characterizes relation-
ships where people treat each other as belonging to the same social cate-
gory by focusing on their commonalities and disregarding distinct individ-
ual identities. Participants are treated as equivalent in some essential respect.
e model typically organizes intense romantic love, the cohesion of mem-
bers of a team, as well as larger scale ethnic, national, gender, or species
identication. For example, a couple in love or a group of people having the
same politics or fans of the same soccer team can form a Communal Sharing
relationship based on their commonalities. People in a Communal Sharing
relationship experience a sense of oneness with othermembers of the group.
e next model, Authority Ranking, orders people into “higher” or
“lower” positions in a legitimate social hierarchy. e model is clearly op-
erative in various dominance hierarchies, such as in the military, but also in
boss-employee, teacher-student, parent-child and other such relationships
where subordinates owe deference and respect, while superiors are expected
to provide leadership, guidance, wisdom, and protection. Authority Rank-
ing relationships may involve coercion and exploitation, but power abuse is
not inherent to the model and renders the relationship unstable.
e third model is labeled Equality Matching. As the label suggests, it
embodies a principle of equality. People treat each other as individuals with
an equal status, and seek for balance in interactions, as is oen the case in in-
teractions among colleagues, equal partners, friends or sometimes enemies.
Interactions within Equality Matching relationships may take the form of
turn-taking, balanced in-kind reciprocity, or eye-for-an-eye vengeance.
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Finally, in Market Pricing, social interactions are coordinated with re-
spect to socially meaningful ratios, rates, or proportions. Market Pricing
underlies utilitarian moral reasoning, proportional justice, cost-benet so-
cial decision making, as well as prices, rents, wages, academic grading, etc.
According to the relationalmodels theory, people implicitly rely on these
four cognitive models to generate, interpret, coordinate, and evaluate their
social relationships.10 e theory also says that people have an inherent mo-
tivation to pursue relationships for their own sake and not just for external
reasons. People use relational models with reference to cultural knowledge
that species how, when, where, and with whom a particular model should
operate. Social relational dierences among cultures and individuals can be
explained as dierences in implementation of the four models. Social con-
icts arise when people apply dierent models to the same social situation
or when they implement the same model dierently. e theory has been
supported by many experimental and observational studies covering popu-
lations from many cultures.11
By integrating the dynamical systems approach with the relational mod-
els approach, I dene social relationships as temporally extended and co-
ordinated complementarities of actions and/or mental states among two or
more participants (cf. Bohl 2015, 681). Coordinationmeans that participants
act, think, and/or feel with reference to each other’s actions, thoughts, and/or
feelings. Complementarity means that what one agent is doing, thinking, or
feeling is incomplete or impossible unless and until another agent meaning-
fully complements it.
5.2 Social-relational emotions
In philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, emotions are typically de-
ned as intrapersonal states that have specic experiential, cognitive, be-
havioral and physiological subcomponents. However, human emotions of-
ten arise in social contexts and have important social functions (Manstead
2006; Berscheid and Ammazzalorso 2003; Clark et al. 2003; Keltner and
Haidt 1999). Relationship scientists view emotions as adaptations for dealing
10 Each relationalmodel also corresponds to a particularmathematical structure.emathe-
matical structure of Communal Sharing is an equivalence relation, homologous to that of
a nominal scale of measurement. e structure of Authority Ranking is linearly ordered
and it corresponds to an ordinal scale of measurement. e mathematical structure of
Equality Matching is that of an ordered Abelian group, and corresponds to the structure
of an interval scale. e structure of Market Pricing is homologous to a ratio scale and
corresponds to an Archimedean ordered eld. (See Fiske 1992).
11 See the online bibliography that lists works applying, critiquing, or developing rela-
tional models theory: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/ske/RM_PDFs/RM_
bibliography.htm (visited 22.08.2016).
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with problems related to coordination of social relationships (Butler 2011,
369; Fiske 2002). In social contexts, the subcomponents of an emotion may
interact not only intrapersonally, but also across two or more people. I will
call such episodes of emotions social-relational emotions.12
ere aremany ways in which social-relational emotionsmay come into
existence. For example, a paradigmatic case of emotional contagion is a
social-relational emotion where an aective state carries over from A to B,
though the aective state of Amay remain uninuenced by B.ere are also
cases where the aective states of A and B synchronously alter because of a
third variable: for instance, because two people are watching the samemovie
or witnessing the same event. According to my denition, this would not be
a genuine case of a social-relational emotion, unless there is also uni- or bi-
directional inuence between A and B, because each person would have the
same aective dynamics alone.
From the perspective of social cognition research, the most interesting
cases of social-relational emotions are those where mutual inuence among
the aective dynamics of two ormore individuals can be observed. A case in
point would be two people yelling at each other, with their level of anger ris-
ing in synchrony. Another examplewould be one person’s anger and another
person’s fear mutually reinforcing each other. In the jargon of extended and
enactive approaches to cognition, these would be cases of coupling between
the emotional subcomponents of interaction partners. However, most peo-
ple would not readily call such examples cases of shared emotions. In the
next subsection, I will shed some light on how we could understand shared
emotions in this framework.
5.3 Shared emotions as a special case of social-relational emo-
tions
I propose to conceptualize shared emotions as a special case of social-
relational emotions. As I explained above, not all cases of social-relational
emotions are such that we would readily call them ‘shared emotions.’ For
example, when two individuals mutually reinforce each other’s irritation, we
would not say that they are sharing an emotion. Shared emotions seem to be
characterized by a specic feature that could be called a sense of oneness. To
explain what I mean by it, I borrow from Helm (2008) a useful distinction
between the subject, the target and the focus of an emotion (see also Schmid
2009, 64–65). e subject is the one who experiences the emotion. e
target is something towards which the emotion is directed. For example, if
12 e idea of social-relational emotions is in accordance with the temporal interpersonal
emotion systems (TIES) approach, see (Butler 2011). e latter approach can be seen as a
dynamical systems framework for analyzing social-relational emotions.
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I am afraid of ying then I am the subject of the fear of ying and the target
of the fear is ying. e focus, however, is something in the background of
the emotion that is rationally connected to the target, making the particular
mode of the emotion comprehensible. In the case of fear of ying, the focus
might bemyself or itmight be someone else; e.g., Imight be concerned about
the safety ofmy child as she travels by airplane.e subject has to have some
concern that explains the connection between the target and the focus: I
need to care about myself or about my child in order to feel frightened about
my ying or the ying of my child.
With these conceptual tools at hand, I propose to analyze shared emo-
tions as social-relational emotions that have a social relationship as its fo-
cus. If lovers are happy to see each other, we have two tokens of happiness
with two dierent subjects and two dierent targets: I am happy to see you
whereas you are happy to see me. But the focus of our happiness is the re-
lationship between us: we are happy to see each-other, because our meeting
positively feeds into our relationship. is is what I mean by sense of one-
ness: it is a phenomenological quality of an aective experience that arises
when the focus of an aective experience of two or more individuals is their
relationship in such a way that the emotion is experienced as having the
quality of nourishing the relationship between the participants of the social
interaction. e sense of oneness is clearly lacking when two people rein-
force each-other’s negative emotions in a conict situation: although there
are social-relational emotions at play, the focus of an emotion tends to be an
isolated individual: I am angry at you (the target), because I experience you
as misbehaving towards me (the focus). e structure of the focus might
also be two-fold: I am angry at you (the target), because I experience you
as misbehaving towards me (focus 1) and as jeopardizing our relationship
(focus 2).
What are the necessary and sucient conditions for an emotion to be
shared? Do all parties need to have the relationship as the focus of their
emotion for an emotion to be shared? Do all parties need to have an emo-
tion with the same mode? What about the target? I think that the answers
to these question depend on one’s theoretical aims and preferences (see also
Michael 2016) and I will not argue for a particular view here. Rather than
a label for a particular phenomenon with a certain essence, everyday talk
about sharing emotions seems to be a folk psychological construct referring
to complex and diverse phenomena. Instead of arguing for a xed set of
conditions under which emotions are truly shared, a more fruitful approach
might be to map out all possible social-relational emotions to create a tax-
onomy for describing various kinds of real life social-relational emotional
experiences. For example, it seems useful to distinguish between the sub-
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jective experience of sharing an emotion and intersubjectively sharing an
emotion. If I experience a sense of oneness with you whereas you lack such
an experience, presumably because our relationship is not at the focus of
your emotional experience, then I have a subjective experience of sharing
an emotion with you without the emotion being intersubjectively shared.
On the other hand, you and I might experience a strong sense of oneness
even if the targets and the modes of our emotional experiences dier. For
example, Imight be immensely grateful to you because you rescuedme from
a burning house whereas you are immensely relieved that you managed to
save my life, but the focus of both of our emotions might be our Communal
Sharing relationship and thus a strong sense of oneness might accompany
experiences of both of us. Whether we should reserve the label ‘shared emo-
tion’ to one or several of these combinations of subjects, targets, focuses and
modes of emotion seems more of a matter of taste than a serious theoretical
issue.at being said, it does not mean that the everyday talk about sharing
emotions is completely arbitrary. I would argue that a sense of oneness is
at the core of sharing emotions, but it is a matter of debate whether other
conditions have to be met as well and if so, what those conditions are.
Let me return to the example of positive emotions in very young in-
fants. ere are two specic moments that seem to call for an explanation:
the caregiver’s central role and the alleged lack of self-other dierentiation
in the infant’s experience. We can make sense of these features by sticking
to individual social-relational emotions and positing a Communal Sharing
relationship between the infant and the caregiver as the focus of their re-
spective emotions.
According to the denition given above of ‘social relationship’, the action
or experience of one party of a relationship is incomplete or impossible un-
less it is complemented by another party of a relationship.is is clearly the
case in Krueger’s example of positive emotions in young infants, since such
states arguably only arise while infants interact with caregivers.e possible
lack of self-other dierentiation refers specically to a Communal Sharing
relationship. Such relationships are based on the common supra-individual
identity and not on separate individual identities. However, we should take
Krueger’s phenomenological analysiswith a grain of salt, because contempo-
rary developmental psychologists would argue that newborns already have
a fundamental sense of self and it is doubtful that it magically disappears in
episodes of positive emotions (see Rochat and Striano 2000). But one can,
of course, also have a Communal Sharing relationship with a fully developed
sense of self. e point is rather that without a self-other dierentiation, it
would be impossible to have other types of social relationship besides Com-
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munal Sharing relationships (e.g., Authority Ranking or Equality Matching
relationships).
How do social-relational emotions arise in the case of positive emotions
in young infants?e rst stage can be described in terms of uni-directional
inuence from the caregiver to the infant: the caregiver’s positive emotional
state alters the emotional state of the infant in such a way that the latter
matches the former at least in its positive valence and possibly also in its
intensity. In the second stage, a feedback-loop within the infant-caregiver
system is created: not only is the positive emotion of the caregiver inuen-
cing the aective state of the infant, but the positive emotion of the infant
is in turn inuencing the aective state of the caregiver. In other words, the
emotional processes of two individuals become coupled. is would be a
scenario most likely to be found in a Communal Sharing relationship: the
infant and the caregiver become experientially united in the same type of
positive emotional experience. is does not mean, however, that the two
individuals own the same token of an emotion: ontologically, there are two
distinct emotional states, albeit mutually dependent and synchronous. On
a more ne-grained level of analysis the emotions of two individuals are
clearly dierent; they have dierent subjects and targets. However, the phe-
nomenology of both individuals may be best described as characterized by
a sense of oneness, which is a typical feature of close Communal Sharing
relationships and which can be explained by locating the relationship at the
focus of the emotion.
Notice that social-relational emotions arise in the context of social re-
lationships, but at the same time they also feed into relationships. If rela-
tionships are temporally extended and coordinated complementarities of
actions and/or mental components among two or more participants, then
social-relational emotions are important parts of the “stu” relationships
are made of. e so-called shared emotions are most likely to be found in
Communal Sharing relationships: both in the sense that they more readily
arise in such relationships, but also in the sense that they enable us to create,
strengthen and maintain Communal Sharing relationships. Whether dier-
ent types of social-relational emotions converge around dierent relational
models is an interesting topic for future research. In the future, I hope to
work out a taxonomy that categorizes social-relational emotions into dier-
ent clusters, based on their structural properties.
A general point to be taken away from this analysis is that in order to
understand social cognitive and aective phenomena, it is not sucient to
do research on the level of individuals and their mental states: we also need
to bring social relationships into the picture.
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6. Conclusion
I have critically analyzed Joel Krueger’s Joint Ownership esis: the view
that two or more people can literally share the same episode of an emotion.
My analysis revealed four serious aws of Krueger’s account of JOT. Firstly,
Krueger fails to clearly distinguish between JOT and the thesis of joint sub-
jects and does not explain what hemeans by the latter. Secondly, he confuses
phenomenological and ontological levels of analysis. On a closer look, his
phenomenological analysis of JOT contradicts JOT as an ontological claim.
irdly, JOT relies on a highly problematic inference from coupling to con-
stitution. Finally, Krueger shis from the claim that the child and the care-
giver jointly realize an emotion to a claim about joint ownership; this is a
non sequitur. Although JOT is false, the case of positive emotions in young
infants is still an interesting case that calls for explanation as an intersubjec-
tive phenomenon. I have argued that the best way to do this is to introduce
another level of analysis: that of social relationships. I have proposed that we
consider the so-called ‘shared emotions’ as special cases of social-relational
emotions, typically arising within and/or giving rise to Communal Sharing
relationships.
Acknowledgments
I am extremely grateful to BrunoMölder for stimulating discussions and de-
tailed feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank
the audiences of the conferences “Reciprocity and social cognition” (23-25
March 2015, Berlin) and ESPP 2015 (14-17 July 2015, Tartu) for comments
and questions. In particular, I am grateful to Pierre Jacob and Stephen But-
terll for their helpful comments. is research has been supported by the
Estonian Science Foundation grant ETF9117, the Centre of Excellence in Es-
tonian Studies (European Union, European Regional Development Fund)
and is related to research project IUT20-5 (Estonian Ministry of Education
and Research).
Bibliography
Adams, F. R. and Aizawa, K. (2001). e bounds of cognition, Philosophical
Psychology 14: 43–64.
Adams, F. R. and Aizawa, K. (2008). e Bounds of Cognition, Blackwell,
Malden.
Vivian Bohl 133
Adams, F. R. and Aizawa, K. (2010). e value of cognitivism in think-
ing about extended cognition, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
9: 579–603.
Aizawa, K. (2010).e coupling-constitution fallacy revisited,Cognitive Sys-
tems Research 11: 332–342.
Berscheid, E. (2004). e greening of relationship science, in H. Reis and
C. Rusbult (eds), Close Relationships: Key Readings, Psychology Press,
New York, pp. 30–41.
Berscheid, E. and Ammazzalorso, H. (2003). Emotional experience in close
relationships, in G. J. I. Fletcher and M. S. Clark (eds), Blackwell Hand-
book of Social Psychology: Interpersonal Processes, Blackwell Publishing,
Malden, pp. 308–330.
Blakemore, S.-J.,Wolpert, D.M. and Frith, C. D. (1998). Central cancellation
of self-produced tickle sensation, Nature Neuroscience 1: 635–640.
Bohl, V. (2015). We readminds to shape relationships, Philosophical Psychol-
ogy 28: 674–694.
Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and
Agency, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Butler, E. A. (2011). Temporal interpersonal emotion systems: e “TIES”
that form relationships, Personality and Social Psychology Review 15: 367–
393.
Clark, A. (2010). Memento’s revenge: e extended mind, extended, in
R. Menary (ed.), e Extended Mind, e MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
pp. 43–66.
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998). e extended mind, Analysis 58: 7–19.
Clark, M., Fitness, J. and Brisette, I. (2003). Understanding people’s percep-
tions of relationships is crucial to understanding their emotional lives, in
G. J. I. Fletcher and M. S. Clark (eds), Blackwell Handbook of Social Psy-
chology: Interpersonal Processes, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, pp. 308–
330.
Colombetti, G. and Krueger, J. (2015). Scaoldings of the aective mind,
Philosophical Psychology 28: 1157–1176.
Fiske, A. P. (1991). Structures of Social Life:e Four Elementary Forms of Hu-
man Relations: Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Match-
ing, Market Pricing, Collier Macmillan, New York.
Fiske, A. P. (1992). e four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a
unied theory of social relations, Psychological Review 99: 689–723.
134 No Joint Ownership! Shared Emotions Are Social-relational Emotions
Fiske, A. P. (2002). Moral emotions provide the self-control needed to sus-
tain social relationships, Self and Identity 1: 169–175.
Fiske, A. P. and Haslam, N. (1996). Social cognition is thinking about rela-
tionships, Current Directions in Psychological Science 5: 143–148.
Gallotti, M. and Frith, C. (2013). Social cognition in the we-mode, Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 17: 160–165.
Gilbert, M. (2006). Aeory of Political Obligation, OxfordUniversity Press,
Oxford.
Helm, B. W. (2008). Plural agents, Noûs 42: 17–49.
Hurley, S. (2010). Varieties of externalism, in R. Menary (ed.),e Extended
Mind,e MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 101–154.
Kagan, A. and Lassiter, C. (2013). e coupling-constitution fallacy: Much
ado about nothing, Pragmatics & Cognition 21: 178–192.
Keltner, D. and Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels
of analysis, Cognition and Emotion 13: 505–521.
Krueger, J. (2013). Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint owner-
ship thesis, Continental Philosophy Review 46: 509–531.
Krueger, J. (2014). Varieties of extended emotions, Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences 13: 533–555.
Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). e social nature of emotion and the emotional
nature of the social, in P. A. M. van Lange (ed.), Bridging Social Psychol-
ogy: Benets of Transdisciplinary Approaches, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mah-
wah, pp. 213–218.
Menary, R. (2006). Attacking the bounds of cognition, Philosophical Psy-
chology 19: 329–344.
Menary, R. (ed.) (2010). e Extended Mind, e MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). e child’s relations with others, in J. Edie (ed.),
e Primacy of Perception, Northwestern University Press, Evanston,
pp. 96–155.
Michael, J. (2016). What are shared emotions (for)?, Frontiers in Psychology
7.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception,e MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Rochat, P. and Striano, T. (2000). Perceived self in infancy, Infant Behavior
& Development 23: 513–530.
Vivian Bohl 135
Ross, D. and Ladyman, J. (2010). e alleged coupling-constitution fallacy
and themature sciences, inR.Menary (ed.),e ExtendedMind,eMIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 155–166.
Salice, A. (2015). ere are no primitive we-intentions, Review of Philosophy
and Psychology 6: 695–715.
Schmid, H. B. (2009). Shared feelings, Plural Action, Springer, Dordrecht,
pp. 59–83.
Schmitz, M. (2017). What is a mode account of collective intentionality?, in
G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality,
Springer, Cham. forthcoming.
Schweikard, D. P. and Schmid, H. B. (2013). Collective intentionality, in
E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2013
Edition.
URL:http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/collective-
intentionality
Searle, J. (2010). Making the Social World: e Structure of Human Civiliza-
tion, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Shergill, S. S., Samson, G., Bays, P.M., Frith, C.D. andWolpert, D.M. (2005).
Evidence for sensory prediction decits in schizophrenia, e American
Journal of Psychology 162: 2384–2386.
Tuomela, R. (2013). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group
Agents, Oxford University Press, New York.
Tuomela, R. and Miller, K. (1988). We-intentions, Philosophical Studies
53: 367–389.
